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About the Authors
Dr. Donald J. Emblen is the guest author of “
From The
Director’
s Desk” in this edition of the Montana Business
Quarterly. Dr. Emblen has been professor of business adminis
tration at Montana State University since 1945 and has played
a leading role in the development of the University’
s out
standing accounting program.
Professor Emblen received an A.B. degree in economics from
Ohio University, an M.B.A. degree in accounting from the Uni
versity of Pennsylvania, and his Ph.D. degree in finance from
Columbia University. Before coming to Montana State Uni
versity, he taught at Union College, St. Lawrence University,
and the University of Rochester and worked as an accountant
in the controller’
s office of the Eastman Kodak Company in
Rochester.
Included in Dr. Em blen’
s wide professional experience are
summer appointments as a finance fellow at the New York
Stock Exchange and as a fellow at the Harvard Case Study
Seminar and the University of Chicago Seminar on New De
velopments in Accounting; a summer as a consultant to the
U.S. General Accounting Office in Washington, D.C.; and two
years, from 1957 to 1959, as technical advisor in business edu
cation to the University of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
Professor Emblen is a member of the Montana Society of
Certified Public Accountants and has served as executive secre
tary of that organization. He has written articles for a num
ber of professional journals and for the predecessor to this
Quarterly, the Montana Business Review.
Lawrence C. Merriam, Jr., the author of the article on Mon
tana’
s state parks, is assistant professor of forestry at Montana
State University. He was educated at the University of Cali
fornia and at Oregon State University, where he received his
Ph.D. in forest management last year. His major interests are
forest recreation and conservation.
Dr. Merriam served as Oregon state parks planner from 1951
•to 1953 and as Oregon state park and highway forester from
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1953 to 1959. Since joining the faculty of Montana State Uni
versity’
s School of Forestry in 1959, he has conducted research
in the socio-economics of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area
(1960-63); has studied wilderness area standards and manage
ment (1963-64); and has worked on the Montana resources
survey.
The Montana Business Quarterly is proud to present in this
issue, as the third in a series of articles on communism, a
capsule review of what really goes on in the political world of
communism. The author, Dr. Harvey G. Kebschull, is assistant
professor of political science at Montana State University. He
received B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Ne
braska in 1955 and 1956 respectively, and his Ph.D. from the
University of Illinois in 1962. In 1957 and 1958, while stationed
in Japan with the United States Army, Professor Kebschull
taught for the University of Maryland Overseas Program. He
also taught at the University of Illinois as a graduate assistant.
In 1961 he spent five months in England doing research on his
thesis. He joined the Montana State University faculty in 1962
and teaches primarily in the field of comparative government.
Recently Dr. Kebschull delivered a paper to the Pacific
Northwest Political Science Association meeting in Pullman,
Washington, on “
The Impact in Montana of Baker v. Carr,”
the Supreme Court case dealing with the reapportionment of
state legislatures.
Other articles by Dr. Norman E. Taylor have appeared in
earlier issues of the Quarterly. As of July 1964 Dr. Taylor will
assume the position of Associate Director of the Bureau of
Business and Economic Research.
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Dr. Donald J. Emblen, Professor of Business Administration,
prepared the following material concerning the demand for
graduates. He has given his permission for its use in “
From
the Director’
s Desk.” Dr. Emblen’
s information pertains pri
marily to the field of accounting, but similar conditions exist
in the other areas of business administration.

P a u l P>. PlcufuyveH.
Dean and Director

Wanted: More Students
We are living in a period of the most rapid growth and
development that our country has experienced in its 188 years
of existence. Most of us are aware of what is happening, but
we tend to go about our daily lives accepting most changes as
a matter of course and without giving too much thought con
cerning the pressures created by an expanding economy. In
spite of the country’
s general prosperity we hear a lot about
unemployment and the concern of the federal government
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about the problem, but at the same time jobs for skilled work
ers are opening up faster than manpower is available to fill
them.
Increasing college enrollments might cause one to wonder
where all these graduates are going to find employment. Obvi
ously, these are not the people who comprise the bulk of the
unemployed. College graduates may not be skilled in a techni
cal sense, but they are the type of people that industry and
government need to train for administrative functions. They
will be readily absorbed. The demand for well-qualified college
graduates appears to be unlimited at the present time and in
the forseeable future.
The demand for students graduating from most schools of
business is particularly keen. Members of a business adminis
tration faculty are constantly being asked by businessmen to
suggest likely candidates for positions in their organizations.
Unfortunately, in too many instances the answer is that there
is no one available. By the very nature of the subject matter
taught, the faculty of the Montana State University School of
Business Administration feels a close kinship to businessmen
and likes to be helpful in matters of recruitment. To have five
or ten job requests for every potential graduate becomes frus
trating. We need more students—more graduates to recom
mend to our business community. .
During the month of February, representatives of twenty
different organizations interviewed seniors in the School of
Business Administration and the tempo of interviews will in
crease as graduation day approaches. A large number of the
firms conducting interviews are from out-of-state. They do
their recruiting early, and consequently there are relatively
few uncommitted seniors remaining by the first of May. Some
national organizations interview twice a year—in the autumn
and again in the spring.
Over the years this School of Business Administration has
built a reputation for excellence in the teaching of accounting.
Consequently, there is a great demand for accounting majors
from public accounting firms as well as from industry and
government. Even though more than four hundred students
will take the first accounting course each year, only about
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thirty students will complete the work required for an account
ing major. This does not mean that all those who did not com
plete the work for an accounting major failed. The first course
in accounting is required for all business administration stu
dents, and for one reason or another many students elect to
concentrate in other subject areas in the University or in other
areas within the field of business administration. Even so, more
students major in accounting than in any other single area
of concentration in the School of Business Administration.
Accounting is one of the fastest growing areas of business.
The reasons are manifold, but certainly one significant reason
is the growing size and complexity of business operations.
Allied to this is the greater awareness on the part of managers
that valuable assistance can be provided by accountants. Ex
cept in the case of very small business organizations, where
management is able to keep on top of the operating details,
those who guide the affairs of business rely upon accountants
to supply them with relevant facts upon which intelligent
decisions can be made. Decision-making by intuition is rapidly
becoming a thing of the past. The risks are too great.
The importance of accounting and accountants in modern
business is evidenced, in part, by the number of accountants
who have risen to top management positions in some of the
country’
s leading corporations. For example, in 1961 over 150
members of the Financial Executives Institute (formerly the
Controllers Institute of America) were company presidents.
Another indication of the growing importance of accountingtrained people is the elevation of many controllers to the more
responsible position of financial vice-president. In 1959, ninetyone members of the Financial Executives Institute had the title
of financial vice-president, and by 1961 the number had in
creased to 235. A few national figures stand out—Gerald Phillippe, chairman of the board at General Electric is an account
ing-trained man, as are Frederic Donner, chairman of the board
of General Motors, Ernest Breech, former board chairman at
Ford, and Robert McNamara, formerly of the Ford Motor Com
pany and now Secretary of Defense.
Opportunities in the field of accounting are unlimited. The
surprising thing is that more young men and women (there is
a place for women too) have not chosen accounting as their
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career. Perhaps accountants have been too modest about pub
licizing the advantages of their occupation. Recently, the
American Accounting Association, with the cooperation of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and other
allied professional organizations, has undertaken an educa
tional program designed to interest high schqol students in
accounting as a career. The need for more accountants is recog
nized by the professional organizations, but before there can
be more accountants there must be more students willing to
undertake a rigorous educational program in college.
Young people usually have preconceived (and often highly
imaginative or dramatized) notions about the kind of work a
physician or a lawyer performs or the kind of work performed
by a space engineer, but few have the slightest idea of what
an accountant does. At best, they may think of him as some
sort of a bookkeeper involved all day long in making detailed
entries in a big book. This a bookkeeper may do, although this
type of worker is rapidly being replaced by machines, but an
accountant is a much more highly trained person. The ac
countant prepares financial reports and interprets them for
management and assists management in many different ways,
all of which involve the financial or money side of the business.
The opportunities for a career in accounting may be attrib
uted, in part, to the variety of fields an accountant may enter.
Private business is by far the largest employer of accountants,
because no business can get along without accounting services.
Even within one business a wide variety of accounting services
may be required. Some accountants specialize in taxation,
others in cost accounting, and some will work as internal
auditors, just to mention a few of the possibilities. Public
accounting as a career holds a great appeal to accounting stu
dents. The fact that public accountants offer accounting, tax
and management advisory services to various clients seems to
offer more “
romance”than working for one company. Federal,
state and local governments employ many accountants, and
many of their accounting positions require people with the
highest degree of professional competence. Many of the serv
ices furnished by government accountants are similar to those
of the public accountant. At the federal level, the United
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States General Accounting Office employs a large number of
accountants, many of whom are Certified Public Accountants,
to check on the expenditure of federal funds and to serve as
financial watchdogs to Congress. Countless millions of dollars
have been saved through the efforts of GAO accountants. The
Internal Revenue Service prefers to hire accountants because
their training makes them better able to carry out the neces
sary investigations of business records. Finally, as in all areas
of accounting the demand for teachers is much greater than
the supply; thus, accounting instruction offers many oppor
tunities to qualified people.
Leaders in the public accounting profession are Certified
Public Accountants. There is considerable prestige associated
with being a CPA because, like the M.D. or LL.B., it indicates
a certain standard of knowledge and skill. Many accountants
not in public practice have earned the CPA designation and
consider it a mark of professional competence. In a sense it
might be considered a kind of status symbol. Most accounting
majors in the School of Business aspire to winning the CPA
certificate even though not all of them plan to enter the public
accounting profession. To them it is a special mark of accom
plishment.
Becoming a CPA is not easy and, for the most part, only the
intellectually gifted achieve that goal. While state laws differ
in their requirements for the CPA certificate, they all have
one thing in common—the uniform CPA examination. All fifty
states use the examination prepared by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants. The examination papers are
also graded by the AICPA in order to assure uniformity in
grading and the maintenance of high standards throughout
the country.
Nationally, only 40 percent of those who attempt the exam
ination pass. This indicates the severity of the examination.
In spite of this, the number of CPAs has increased about 15,000
in the past five years and about 25,000 in the past ten years.
There are now over 80,000 CPAs in the United States.
The rate of growth of the CPA profession in Montana has
exceeded the national average. At the beginning of 1950 the
state of Montana had issued 164 CPA certificates since the
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inception of the CPA Law in 1909, but the number of certifi
cates now issued totals 401. This represents a 144 percent
increase during the fourteen year period.
Montana is one of the few states that does not require a
minimum of experience, in addition to passing the examina
tion, before granting the CPA certificate. For^those trying to
become CPAs, the lack of an experience requirement, as a
precedent to their receiving a certificate, works to their imme
diate advantage. At present, a Montana resident needs only to
pass the uniform CPA examination, and accounting majors in
the School of Business feel they have everything to gain and
nothing to lose by taking the examination in May of their
senior year.
During the period 1950 to February 1964, 126 accounting
graduates from Montana State University received Montana
CPA certificates. This is nearly one-half of the certificates
issued in the state during this period. Considering the rela
tively small number of students that specialize in accounting
in the School of Business this is an impressive number of suc
cessful candidates.
We mentioned earlier that only about 40 percent of all candi
dates pass the examination. All states allow more than one
attempt to pass the examination so it is possible for a candidate
to be successful in part of the examination one time (there are
four parts) and complete the remainder after one or more sub
sequent attempts. The national average for those passing all
parts of the examination on the first try is only about 7 percent.
In the May 1963 examination for Montana, 11 out of the 20
candidates who were successful passed all parts upon their
first attempt. Compare this rate of success (55 percent) with
the national average of 7 percent. Nine of the 11 passing upon
the first try were senior accounting majors in the Montana
State University School of Business at the time they took the
examination. There were 27 senior accounting majors in the
spring quarter of 1963. One-third of the class passed all parts
of the May 1963 examination, and an additional three of those
were successful at their next attempt in the November 1963
examination. The class of 1962 performed even better. Out of
a total of 20 students who were enrolled in the CPA Review
course, 10 were successful upon their first attempt.
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It should be emphasized that it is not necessary to be a CPA
in order to be a good accountant and a successful one. The
CPA designation was originally issued to public accountants
as a license to practice public accounting with the intent to
provide protection to the public. Lawyers and doctors are
. licensed by the state for the same reason. Accountants em
ployed by private businesses or government do not need to
be CPAs in order to get ahead. What really counts in all areas
of accounting is competence.
One fascinating aspect of accounting is that it is changing
• rapidly, as business itself changes, so that it furnishes a real
I challenge to the inquisitive mind. The learning process is never
completed, and graduation from college should signify only
one step in the accumulation of knowledge. An accounting
graduate of Montana State University, or any other university,
■is not a finished product. A collegiate education in accounting
provides a sound foundation upon which to build, but many
phases of accounting cannot be taught in the classroom. Be
cause each business differs in some respect from all others, its
accounting procedures will differ even though the same ac
counting principles will be applicable in all cases. The best way
to learn the practical application of accounting procedures is
by working in a business. Therefore, to encourage a combina
tion of the benefits of the classroom and business experience
the School of Business encourages students to take advantage
of its accounting internship program. A number of state and
national public accounting firms are glad to employ capable
accounting majors for a three-month period during the winter
quarter. This is a wonderful opportunity for a student to see
how accounting is performed in a number of different busi•nesses. More and more private businesses are offering intern•ship opportunities to accounting majors during the summer.
Here the experience is limited to one company but it is no less
valuable to the student. As a rule, students who have taken
an intership return to school fired with more enthusiasm for
•accounting and a realization that there is a lot more for them
to learn.
The American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business
places its stamp of approval on schools of business that meet
its high standards. There are approximately 587 colleges and
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universities in the United States offering degrees in business
administration, but only 110 schools have received accredita
tion. Montana State U niversity’
s School of Business Adminis
tration is one of those accredited. This means that students
attending the School of Business Administration will receive
a quality education provided they are motivated to take advantage of the opportunities offered them.
Many businessmen recognize the quality of our school and
express their confidence by seeking our graduates. Unfor
tunately, there are not enough well qualified students to go
around. We need more students, but the emphasis should be
on “
students”and not on “
more.” We are not interested in
volume for its own sake. Our classes are already too large. We
need students who will rise to the challenge of hard work in
an exciting and rewarding field of study—American business.
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Montana and Its State Parks
LAWRENCE C. MERRIAM, JR.
Assistant Professor of Forestry
Montana State University, Missoula

From a scenic and recreational standpoint, Montana has
superb assets. Its wonders have been described in song and
story by men like John Steinbeck, and elegantly illustrated
by C. M. Russell and others. Perhaps its best known sites and
visitor attractions are on federal land—as, for instance, Glacier
National Park, part of Yellowstone National Park, and other
numerous forested and mountainous scenic spots managed by
the Forest Service. Other agencies such as the Bureau of Land
Management, Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, and
Fish and Wildlife Service have now, or are planning for, use
of their lands for recreation. While Montana has a good be
ginning in a state park system of twenty-six units, there has
been a general tendency to let the federal government make
the major effort in providing for recreation users. An overall
state park plan with balanced site locations, adequate site plan
ning and development, and sufficient staff and field personnel
has been inhibited by the low appropriation and legislative
support for the State Parks Division and by its seclusion in
the Montana Highway Department.
Montana’
s state park program got its start in 1938 when
Congress made a gift to the state of Montana of 160 acres,
including the Morrison Cave (now called Lewis and Clark
Caverns State Park). As part of the CCC program, the Na
tional Park Service maintained a camp near the Cave to assist
the state of Montana in the development of the park. The state
was to match federal funds on the project. This was not done,
even though a parks commission was established by the 1939
Montana Legislature.
The Montana State Parks Commission included three men,
and the State Forester was designated as State Parks Director.
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They were empowered to levy taxes for park support and to
collect entrance fees. The Commission also made regulations
and utilized park fee income for park purposes.
From the beginning legislative appropriations for park activi
ties were meager, and overall planning was minimal. The
coming of World War II and the curtailment of travel further
added to state park problems. Operations virtually ceased from
1942 to 1946. In February, 1946, the State Park Commission
appointed a Director of State Parks to assist the State Forester
in park matters. Despite only token appropriations, eight addi
tional parks were acquired by 1950; then a deficit expenditure
caused further waning of legislative support. In 1953 the Parks
Commission was abolished, and the Director and all state park
functions were transferred from the Office of the State For
ester to the Montana State Highway Commission where they
remain today.
The Highway Commission has been given custody, control,
and jurisdiction of all state parks, state recreational areas, state
public camps, state historic sites, and state highway rest areas
—to conserve these areas and to provide for their use and
enjoyment. Further, the Commission is to acquire, with legis
latively authorized funds, by purchase, lease, agreement, con
demnation, or gift, new areas and objects for state parks, and
is to make rules and develop policies of park operation. The
Highway Commission may cooperate with federal, state, and
other entities in the furtherance of park programs.
The state park system of Montana now includes 26 units,
ranging in size from 1 to 2,770 acres. In the words of the State
Park Director, Ashley Roberts, it could not be called a planned
system. All 26 units were acquired by donation or lease, mostly
from federal agencies, at minimal cost to the state. Over half
(57 percent) of these state units are in the high federal land
counties of the west and southwest portions of the state (Table
1). This is also the region where the federal government has
the greatest number of recreation facilities, potential sites, and
recreation reserves (parks, wilderness areas, etc.). Thus, in
some instances, the state units may be competitive as well as
complementary.
There has never been a master plan for the state parks of
Montana which included the location of sites in various parts
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of the state with individual layout plans. A broad general
approach was made in 1960 when the State Parks Division and
the National Park Service cooperated in the report, “
A Pro
gram of Action for Montana State Parks.”Now the Forest and
Conservation Experiment Station at Montana State University
is carrying on a statewide study of Montana park and recre
ation potentials.
Individual sites have often been developed to accommodate
the maximum, and not optimum, numbers of users and types
of uses within an area’
s carrying capacity. For example, Yel
low Bay State Park on Flathead Lake, just south of the Mon
tana State University Biological Station, is only 15 acres in
size. Barely adequate for a lake access and small picnic area,
the area currently is overcrowded with camping and picknicking; and the swimming, boating, and fishing all occurring at
the small lake access area creates dangerous possibilities. (See
Table 1.)
The Director of the Montana State Parks Division, Mr. Rob
erts, has no staff planners to help with the development of site
plans. Although the Montana State University School of For
estry and the National Park Service have both given Mr.
Roberts aid and advice, their piecemeal efforts have not been
entirely satisfactory.
Today the Montana State Park System is administered by
an able and hard-working director, who, with only one other
office staff member (a secretary) operates out of the Highway
Department in Helena. Eight other permanent employees are
located in various sections of Montana. Legislative appropria
tions for state parks are inadequate (some $150,000 in fiscal
1963, of which $30,000 was a special allotment and $80,000-plus
was for salaries and wages.) Current appropriations are not
sufficient for adequately maintaining present park areas, to
say nothing of acquiring needed lands in those sites (Table 1)
and expanding the system. A 1963 legislative act to use one
percent of gasoline tax collections for state parks, based on
the theory that this is the tax on motor boat fuel, is currently
being contested in court.
Montana and Oregon have the only two State park systems
in the United States where the state parks are administered
through the Highway Commission and the Highway Depart-
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—Indicates park locations. Numbers correspond with Table
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ment. Having been state parks planner under the Oregon
system, I am aware of some of the complications of this
arrangement. With the current push for highway expansion
in western states, highway departments and commissions have
little time for park matters. Highway engineers by training
and orientation are not inclined toward the aesthetic and
intangible aspects of recreation. The real test in a highway
department state parks organization comes when a new high
way location is projected across a scenic state park area.
Which values will be maximized—highway or park? The gas
tax money, directly earmarked for highway use, is jealously
guarded by road users who do not relish its use for state
parks. While the state parks in Oregon have been supported
this way, current indications do not look hopeful for gas tax
support of Montana’
s state parks.
What is the solution to Montana’
s state parks problem?
It would be easy to say more money and personnel are needed.
This is obvious. But how do you provide these things within
the existing framework and financial realities of Montana’
s
state government? To begin with, a basic study of park and
recreation needs in Montana should be made to determine
not only the needs but also the activities involved. The study
should examine the user groups involved, possible sources of
funds, including user fees, and should discover which lands
are available. The integration of recreation use with other
land uses, and the possibilities of interagency and private
owner cooperation to complement recreation efforts rather
than duplicate them, would be major contributions of such a
study. Guidelines for future expansion and location of state
park units, and recommendations for the proper organization
and agency status of the State Parks Division should be out
lined. A comprehensive statewide recreation plan should
evolve from such a study.
Study efforts of this type have been successful in California
and other states, particularly when study committees have con
sisted of broadly representative social, political, and agency
groups rather than merely departmental groups. Coordination
and basic work would have to be done by the State Parks
Division and other state agencies under the direction of a
gubernatorially appointed committee. The aforementioned
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studies of the Forest and Conservation Station, Montana State
University, on recreation would be helpful to this committee.
On the national scale, the Outdoor Recreation Resources
Review Commission (1958-1962) is a good example of a suc
cessful effort along these lines.
Once such a study and comprehensive recreation plan is
made, hopefully it may be determined that Montana can
sponsor a fine park and recreation system. If not, development
aid can be obtained through the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation
at the federal level, which is now helping some federal agencies
in recreation planning and development on lands in Montana.
Since tourism, which is closely related to outdoor recreation
and park use, is an important sector of Montana’
s economy,
a study of parks and recreation is a good investment in Mon
tana’
s economic future.
The state parks system as an important contribution to the
outstanding park and recreation assets of Montana needs
public support and consideration for its future well being.
REFERENCES
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A Look at Competitive Bidding
NORMAN E. TAYLOR
Associate Professor of Business Administration
Montana State University, Missoula

Introduction
Pricing problems and opportunities typically have been the
focus of substantial top-management effort and time. With
varying degrees of insight and emphasis, most executives do
try to “
buy low and sell high”
—within the limits set by the
total firm environment and company objectives. However,
traditional decision rules have had to be re-examined because
of the many structural, legal, policy and competitive changes
which have occurred since 1945. In many cases, pricing deci
sions have been far from optimum; some businessmen have
wistfully commented that not only are the rules changing, but
the game itself is different. A century ago, three generations
of a family might profitably manage the same basic institution
in an essentially static industry. Today, in a single generation,
an owner may find himself progressing through several indus
tries in order to survive in our increasingly dynamic American
economic system.
Every day questions are being raised concerning what is
legal, what is possible, and what may be strategically desirable
as a pricing policy. Most of the pricing models and theories
developed by academicians have focused on the seller’
s prob
lems. One facet of pricing which has not received as much
attention as other problems by economists or marketing
analysts is that which deals with value determination in buying
raw materials, and particularly with bidding strategy. InNote: The Montana State University School of Forestry and the
School of Business Administration jointly financed research time for the
author to explore this topic. The Ford Foundation also contributed
by permitting the author to participate in the Research Workshop in
Marketing, held on the University of California campus at Berkeley
during the summer of 1963. This article is only a part of the full
study which will be published later.

A LOOK AT COMPETITIVE BIDDING

23

efficient buying (i.e., paying more for inputs than a market
requires) comes “
off the top,”so to speak; a thousand dollars
added to net worth by more effective competitive purchasing
might be equal to a contribution from added revenue of, say,
$20,000 more in sales.
It is difficult enough to conceptualize a model itself; further
more, it is almost impossible to obtain accurate pricing data to
test hypotheses and to make evaluations. Fortunately, for at
least one important Montana industry, cost data are available
from public records showing the purchases of government
timber which constitutes the raw material for the wood prod
ucts industry. In the discussion which follows, it will be
apparent to many readers that a direct determination, and/or
transference, of buying strategies will not be possible for
obvious reasons. Nevertheless, as an approach to the general
problem of value determination, it is hoped that some fresh
insights and perspectives may be stimulated.
Before discussing the model itself, a word is in order about
the purpose and emphasis of the study. The writer was not
concerned with the forest industry debate regarding the pros
and cons of sealed versus oral bidding. This study grew out of
an interest in pricing. Stumpage sales data simply offered the
opportunity of testing certain notions that would conceivably
arise in the development of a bidding model. We are not making
normative judgments on the merits of sealed bidding. The
assumption is made that bidders enter sales because they want
what is being sold: that is, they would prefer to purchase
timber outright than to purchase from a logger or other middle
man with the risk of not getting a sufficient supply. It might be
said, however, that if government agencies continue to offer
timber under sealed-bid conditions, it would be the better part
of wisdom for buyers to understand the penalties and the op
portunities implicit in the activity. Until the circumstances are
changed, if indeed they should be, a prudent buyer should
exploit any advantage in bidding methods that can be devised.
In recent years, government agencies have been reasonably
responsive to industry requests regarding sale size, timing,
and bidding method. These agencies have a stake in a healthy,
profitable harvesting and processing structure, although this is
only one of several important interests and responsibilities.
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In recent years the U.S. Forest Service has, in selected areas,1
increased the proportion of sealed-bid sales, ostensibly either
to accommodate the small firms, or, alternatively, to insure
competition if cooperation among bidders were suspected.
For whatever reasons, at least some degree of sealed-bid
sales will probably continue to be offered. If a firm must
acquire some of its timber from these sales, it should have some
kind of strategy to guide its buying decisions. Short-run needs
may dictate a temporary departure from the broader company
goals but some planning and consistent direction of efforts is
required for the realization of long-term company objectives.
A firm may have any of numerous objectives with its buying
policies. It may wish to minimize certain risks, or to maximize
short-run profit; it may wish to reduce competition by reducing
the number of competitors bidding against it, or possibly to
increase its share of the raw material supply; it may wish to
generate maximum returns on sales or investment, adjusting
the rate of output (and timber purchasing) accordingly; or it
may wish to sell at a profit all the stumpage that it can convert
or acquire and resell, foregoing immediate profits for capital
additions and greater integration. Whatever the com pany’
s
explicit goals, or implicit goals discernible from its behavior,
the writer assumes that stumpage buying from public forests
is engaged in because of a rational need and, hence, not to be
overlooked by management in its planning or done perfunc
torily merely because it is complex. It is probably fair to say
that the majority of public timber buyers wish either (a) to
obtain the maximum quantity of stumpage (at a given level
of quality, species mixture, et cetera) for what they have to
spend; or (b) to obtain their wood fibre needs at minimum cost.
If this is a valid characterization, let us look at the bidding
process.

The Model

In the literature which prompted the w riter’
s interest in this
area,- the models which had been developed did not fit the
‘
Northern California and western Montana, to cite only two regions.
-See Lawrence Friedman, “
A Competitive Bidding Strategy,”Operations
R esearch , February 1956; Alfred Oxenfeldt, et al., Insights Into Pricing ,
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bidding problems which timber buyers face in two major
respects. First, the bidding range for stumpage (standing
timber) is closed in public sales, not open. Only those bids
equal to, or above the advertised (appraised) price are ac
ceptable to the Forest Service. Second, the successful bidder is
the highest bidder (not the lowest as in the supply type of
transaction). A significant advantage of the model being pro
posed is that the standard of comparison for the development
of ratios is exogenous (entirely outside the system), subject
only to indirect pressure for modification. The bench-mark
prices (appraised values determined by state or federal timbermanagement specialists) are principally derived from trans
actions evidence and from operators’records. If biases do
exist, they are assumed to be reasonably uniformly applied,
at least within a given bidding region.3
Except for the differences noted above, the following model
is comparable to those cited.
Let: R = the dollar ($) sales value of the end products obtain
able from the timber in question (it may be expressed
either as a lump sum or as a value per thousand board
feet,4 hereafter abbreviated as mbf);
S = the dollar ($) bid price on the stumpage of one
bidder;
S' = the dollar ($) appraised price on the stumpage indi
cated by the seller (for example, the U.S. Forest
Service);
P — profit;
V = total conversion costs (all costs, from felling through
manufacturing to loading for shipment);
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Belmont, California, 1961, pp. 43-62; David
W. Miller and Martin K. Starr, Executive Decisions and Operations
Research, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1961, pp.
223-238.
"The bid-ratio, or dollar-sum difference, calculation is a more plausible
base than ratios which are related to the bidders’“
estimated costs”as
employed in the models cited in footnote 2.
‘
The same is true of the values for S, S', P, V and A.
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A = the dollar ($) difference between end product value
(R) and conversion costs (V).
By definition,

R = S + V + P

Therefore,

R — V = S -}- P

Also by definition,

R —V = A

Therefore,

A = S -f- P

or5

P = A —S

In theory, in the long run, the value of S should be the same
as the value for S' (where S' = R [estimated] — V [estimated]
— P = S). In practice, in the short run, S and S' will not
normally coincide; and when they do, it will often be due to
an absence of bidding and not to an industry judgment as to
the appropriateness of S'. There may even be active disagree
ment, i.e., the buyer may assert that S' is too high but that he
must have the raw material and thus must bid at this level
(S = S') or have his bid judged unresponsive (lower than the
required minimum).
If we assume that there is no cost of bidding, then A — S
=- P, and:
if S is greater than A, P is negative (loss);
if S is equal to A, P is zero (neither profit nor loss);
if S is less than A, P is positive (profit).
But there is uncertainty whether or not a given S value will
get the bid; therefore, what are the probabilities of success for
different values of S? It is obvious that: (1) the lower the
value of S, the less the probability of success in getting stump‘
Compare to the Miller-Starr equation P = X — C, where X equals
the amount bid and C equals the cost (estimated) of fulfilling the
contract; the mirror case is thus evident, since the X and S values
are the ones that vary. Note that A is not a cost but the value of end
products minus conversion costs; it includes the price paid for stumpage
but also profit, risk, taxes and interest. “
A”will be expressed as a
multiple of S'.
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age, other things being equal, but the greater the rate of profit
if one is the highest bidder; (2) the greater the value of S,
the greater the probability of success in getting stumpage but
the lower the rate of profit (ceteris paribus).
If t equals the probability of success, the expected profit (P)
equals t (A — S) + (1 — t) (0) = t (A — S).° The expected
profit equals the average return per bid which the firm would
obtain if (1) it repeated the same bid on a large number of sales
with the same estimated V and R and, (2) the probability of
its being awarded the contract remained fixed at t.
The foregoing statement amounts to a definition of expected
profit, and if we know t, we can determine the expected profit.
We know:
1. That P = f (t, S), and,
2. That the probability ranges from 1 to 0, that its value is a
function of the size of the bid, and that as S increases t in
creases, and as S decreases t decreases.
Suppose a firm is bidding on stumpage and the hypothetical
values are as follows:7
R = $100,000 ($100/m board feet)
V = $51,000 ($51/m board feet)
then R — V = A = $49,000, and A — S (the amount bid) =
P (profit).
"The product of (1 — t) (0) is, of course, zero and can be ignored; there
can be no chance for a profit on stumpage you do not acquire. An
implicit assumption is made that the bidders are behaving independ
ently. If they are not, the cooperating bidders would be treated as single
bidders, for example, in the case where all but one abstain (or merely
bid the minimum S') and the stumpage is shared if the appointed bidder
is successful. The bidding problem under discussion is not changed,
however, even if there is tacit agreement among some buyers not to bid
against selected other firms. Since the parties to the understanding do
not bid against one another, any entente member would ignore the
bidding strategy of the other members.
'The numbers used in the illustration do not refer to any particular sale,
or series of sales; however, after reviewing bidding data in four states
over a five-year period, it can be asserted that the values are both
realistic and consistent.
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TABLE 1
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
Lump Sum Bid
(S)
$50,000
47.500
45.000
42.500
40.000
37.500
35.000
32.500

Probability of Award8
(t)
1.00

.90
.75
.55
.30
.15
.05

0. 00°

Profit
(A-S)
— $

1,000

+ 1,500
+ 4,000
+ 6,500
+ 9,000
+ 11,500
+ 14,000
+ 16,500

“
For every bid there is a probability of success; the t values are prior
probabilities.
“
Assuming that the appraised value by the seller (possibly the U.S.
Forest Service) amounted to, say, $34,000, then any bid below this
figure would be unresponsive and thus not allowed; hence, the proba
bility of 0.00 at a bid of $32,500.

TABLE 2
EXPECTED PROFITS
Bid
(S)
$50,000
47.500
45.000
42.500
40.000
37.500
35.000
32.500

(Average) Expected Profit (Per Sale)
(P)
1.00 (49,000-50,000) = —$1,000
.90 (49,000-47,500) = +$1,350
.75 (49,000-45,000) = +$3,000
.55 (49,000-42,500) = +$3,575
.30 (49,000-40,000) = +$2,700
.15 (49,000-37,500) = +$1,725
.05 (49,000-35,000) = +$ 700
.00 (49,000-32,500) = ±$
0

The maximum expected profit then would be equal to $3,575
with a bid of $42,500. If the firm repeated this bid many times
(other things being equal), this would result in an average
return of $3,575 per bid, which is higher than for any other bid.
We have assumed that the $100,000 figure (R) (the expected
end product value) is known. It does not matter that the firm
does not know the exact selling value of the products it will
produce out of the sale. The procedure and the bid will remain
the same despite any uncertainty about the actual value to
the buyer of a thousand board feet.
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Now, a firm can and does accumulate data concerning its
performance—its conversion costs (felling, bucking, skidding,
loading, hauling, and so on), percentage of utilization (e.g.,
overrun), bidding experience, the selling prices of individual
items, grades, species, et cetera—plus trade association statistics
and other price and cost data. A firm can summarize, for a
series of bids, the ratio between estimated receipts and realized
receipts for the product mix. This may be meaningful and
helpful for many purposes. It will not, however, influence
the bid process in any way, provided there is no consistent
bias in the guesswork. Simple errors have no effect and are
to be ignored since the actual receipts are not determined by
the amount bid.
Errors in judgment will be indicated by the dispersion of
realized revenue values around the estimated values. The
actual profit from any one successful bid might be higher or
lower by, say, 50 percent than the amount anticipated. How
ever, the relative desirability of any bid is not in the least
affected; the expected profits are affected equally. While there
may be uncertainty with respect to the amount of profit of
any one contract, this variability is common to, and unavoid
able for, any potential-bid level.
Thus we have the means whereby a firm can determine that
bid, among all others, which will maximize expected short-run
profit. The only remaining data required are the probabilities
of award to be associated with the range of reasonable bids.
Conceptually, this entire procedure is simple; but the prob
ability-distribution [t = (f) S] does present some important
problems.
In the case of sealed bidding for government (state as well
as federal) stumpage, the competitors and the amounts they
have bid are known. It is, therefore, a straightforward task to
review the bidding record for each competing firm. Let us sup
pose that we, company A, wish to develop a bidding strategy.
How should we proceed? In each instance where competitor
X has bid, one can determine the ratio of X ’
s bid to the gov
ernment appraised, or advertised, price (not to what we may
have bid). For example, if we obtained the hypothetical values
below, we could develop a frequency distribution of selected
ratio values.
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TABLE 3

Sale
No.
1
2
3
4
5

Forest Service
Estimated
Vol
Stumpage Value
ume
Av./M
(MM bf) Total
$12.50
2
$25,000
1
10.00
10,000
15.00
5
7,500
1
18,500
18.50
16.00
40,000
2y2

Amount Bid
by X
Av./M
Total
$15.00
$ 30,000
18.00
18,000
31.50
15,750
46.25
46,250
56.00
140,000

Ratio
of Bid (X)
to Ap
praised
Value
1.2
1.8
2.1
2.5
3.5

Continuing the comparison for, let us say, 25 previous sales
in which X bid, Company A might prepare the following table:
TABLE 4
Ratio
X/Forest Service Appraisal
1.0-1.49
1.5 - 1.99
2.0-2.49
2.5 - 2.99
3.0-3.49
3.5 - 3.99
4.0 - 4.49
4.5 - 4.99
Total

Frequency
1
3
5
7
4
3
1
1
25

We would want to explain X ’
s higher bid ratios. Ordinarily,
the observer attributes high ratios to distress bidding, reflecting
a fear of running out of raw material. But these might also be
the result of market pressures, the desire for a second shift,
long-term sales contracts, the anticipation of greater demand
for stumpage, and therefore, higher prices and so forth. (Com
pany A would also want to study its own high deviations which
probably would be due to more than just the estimated timber
quality, species mixture, distance from the mill, site and stand
classes, road costs, gradient of the slope, elevation, and degree
of distress.)
From Table 4 we observe the frequency of occurrence for
each ratio; from these data we calculate the probability of
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occurrence of each ratio. For example, the ratio (range) 2.0
2.49 occurred five times out of 25 bids. The probability, thus,
is 5/25 or 0.20. The remainder of the bid ratios can be listed as:
TABLE 5
PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION
Probability of
Ratio
Ratio
X/Forest Service Appraisal
.04
1.0 - 1.49
.12
1.5- 1.99
.20
2.0 - 2.49
.28
2.5 - 2.99
.16
3.0-3.49
.12
3.5 - 3.99
.04
4.0 - 4.49
.04
4.5 - 4.99
1.00

Total

The number of intervals, and their magnitude would be de
termined by the array of ratios obtained. To eliminate the
possibility of tie bids (largely due to the large interval selected)
let us raise the bid slightly. We can say that a bid of 1.50 times
the value the Forest Service places on the stumpage will be
higher than competitor X ’
s bid with the probability of 0.04.
A bid of 4.5 times the appraised value would be higher than
X’
s bid with a probability of 1.00 — 0.04 = 0.96. A bid, say,
of 6.0 times the advertised valuation will be higher than X ’
s
bid with a probability of 1.00, if X had never exceeded that
ratio in a large number of bids. Therefore, we can obtain the
following values:
TABLE 6
Company A’
s
bid as a multiple
of Forest Service
estimated value
1.01 - 1.50
1.51 -2.00
2.01 - 2.50
2.51 - 3.00
3.01-3.50
3.51 -4.00
4.01 - 4.50
4.51 - 5.00

Probability
that Company A’
s
bid is higher
than bid of X
0.04
0.16
0.36
0.64
0.80
0.92
0.96
1.00
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Hence, for any bid we submit (expressed in its proportion to
the appraised price) we now have the probability that this bid
will be higher than the bid of X. If X is the only competitor,
we have the probability of award as a function of the amount
bid and we can determine that bid (or bid range) that will
give the maximum expected profit if X is the only other bidder.
To test this argument, let us assume we are bidding on a
stand of timber with X as the only other interested bidder.
Suppose we bid two and one-half times the appraised value,
then S = 2.50 S'. The probability that we would be successful
is 0.36 (from Table 6). If we are in fact successful, our profit
will be:
P = t (A - S) ‘

|

= 0.36 (A — 2.50 S')
If A is, say (in dollars) equal to 3.01 S',
P = 0.36 (3.01 S' — 2.50 S')
= 0.36 (0.51 S') = 0.18 S'
Our expected profit is equal to 18 percent of the advertised
(minimum) price which can readily be calculated for the sale
in question.10
Using the same method and the probabilities from Table 6,
we can derive the following table:
TABLE 7
Ratio of Company
A’
s Bid(S) to Forest
ExpectedProfit
Service Appraisal (S')
(when X is the only other bidder)
1.50
P = 0.04(3.01 S'-- 1.50 S') = 0.04 X + 1.51 S' =_ +0.06 S'
2.00
0.16(3.01 S'-- 2.00 S') = 0.16 X + 1.01 S' == +0.16 S'
2.50
0.36(3.01 S'--2.50 S') = 0.36 X + 0.51 S' == +0.18 S'
3.00
0.64(3.01 S'--3.00 S') = 0.64 X + 0.01 S' == +0.01 S'
3.50
0.80(3.01 S'--3.50 S') = 0.80 X —0.49 S' ==—0.39 S'
4.00
0.92(3.01 S'--4.00 S') = 0.92 X —0.99 S' == —0.91 S'
4.50
0.96(3.01 S'--4.50 S') = 0.96 X — 1.49 S' ==— 1.43 S'
5.00
1.00(3.01 S'--5.00 S') = 1.00 X — 1.99 S' ==— 1.99 S'
Expected profit (P) = t(A-S); assume A = 3.01 S',
Therefore,
P = t(3.01 S' - S)
10T h e 18 percent expected profit rate is not on cost or a return on

investment although it could easily be compared to either base.
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We see that a bid of 2.5 times the appraised value would
give the maximum expected profit. This is true even though
a bid ratio of 1.5 indicates a much higher rate of profit; the
higher return ratio is more than offset by the low probability
of bidding success. If S' was $50,000, we would offer a bid of
$125,000 and have an expected profit of $9,000 (18 percent of
$50,000). The actual return on any one sale would undoubtedly
be at variance with the expected profit rate; however, over
many such bids the realized return should closely approximate
0.18 S' as shown in Table 7.n
When we have other bidders, we would have to duplicate the
process for each of them as already outlined. After obtaining
the probability distribution function for (Y) and (Z) and so
on, the mechanics of determining the proper bid strategy is
not difficult. The probability of joint occurrence of two inde
pendent events is simply the product of the probabilities of
the two events separately. If the probability of a 2.51 bid ratio
being higher than Y’
s bid is 0.69, the probability of this bid
being higher than both X and Y is equal to 0.64 times 0.69 or
0.441612. A table might then be prepared to show the prob
ability of our bid being higher than any single competitor’
s
and also of all combinations of competitors’
; we would have
once more a probability distribution function expressed as a
function of the amount bid. Hence, when the competitors are
known, and when sufficient data on past experience can be
obtained, the proper long-run bid strategy can be ascertained
which will yield the maximum expected profit.
Suppose, however, we do not know who will be bidding
against us. We cannot, therefore, develop the detailed kind of
information illustrated above. In this instance we must look
at what all competitors have done in the past, and derive some
estimate of “
average”bidding behavior. By tabulating all bids

"Anyone familiar with the forest industries would instantly recognize
the unreality of the listed expected profit values vis-a-vis the indicated
bid ratios (S). In this case the bid ratio range, as documented in an
other study, is empirically defensible; the profit estimates are only
I • illustrative.
,2This is true provided the bids of X and Y are independent and no
relationship can be established. If, for example, Y always bids higher
than X when both are bidding, one could then ignore the bids of X
and not have to calculate the joint probability product.

|
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for all sales in the area in which we must acquire timber, we
can prepare a table which lists the probabilities that a given
bid will be higher than the average competitor’
s bid (Table 8).
TABLE 8
Ratio of Company A’
s
Bid (S ) to Forest Service
Appraisal (S')
1.5
2.0

2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0

Probability that
Company A’
s bid is higher
than average bid
0.03
0.14
0.34
0.66

0.82
0.94
0.98
1.00

If we then know, or can reasonably estimate how many will be
bidding on a particular sale, our probability of being the high
bidder over a series of sales will be the product of the average
competitor’
s probability (t“
) where the exponent equals the
number of competitors. Such a table and procedures would be
used whenever the competitors cannot be identified (Table 9).
TABLE 9
Ratio of Company A’
s
Probability that
Company A’
s bid is higher
Bid (S) to Forest Service
Appraisal (S')
than N competitors
(N = 3)
1.5
0.000
2.0
0.003
2.5
0.039
3.0
0.287
3.5
0.551
4.0
0.830
4.5
0.941
5.0
1.000

The calculation of expected profit for any bid, given the
data in Tables 8 or 9, is handled as before. We have the neces
sary “
probability of award”distribution function. The sub
stitution of values in the equation [P = t (A — S)], where A
and S are expressed as percentages of S', yields an expected
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profit figure for each bid, over many such bids, when the
identity of competitors is not known.
One more situation can be noted, and that is when the
number of competitors that must be out-bid is not known.
Obviously, when we do not know their number, we can only
proceed with average characteristics applied to an estimate of
the numbers who may bid. We would expect that an increase
in the number of competitors would reduce the amount of
expected profit; at the same time the market share required
(with maximum profit expected) could be obtained by a lower
bid ratio approaching the pure competition case of zero prof
its.13
In many of the bidding situations involving Forest Service,
Bureau of Land Management, and state stumpage, neither the
individual bidder nor the number of bidders will be known.
Even so, the total number of eligible bidders usually can be
fairly closely ascertained. Occasional surprise bids may come
from gyppo loggers taking a fling at entrepreneurship.
For the most part, however, there will be a reasonably stable
aggregate number. Also, for a given sale, many potential com
petitors can be eliminated from consideration for a variety of
reasons. For example, the kind of logging required may permit
Company A to ignore a number of competitive firms on tech
nical grounds: some may be ignored because they already have
ample supplies under contract and could not fulfill a new
contract in the time allowed; some can be eliminated because
of the distance of the timber from the mill. Some can be
ignored because they do not have the skill or cannot obtain
capital for road construction; small operators often cannot
perform on a large sale, and large operators frequently ignore
small sales because they cannot afford to move a “
logging
show”unless a considerable volume is offered. Some mills
will not bid on stands heavy with a particular specie because
it must be processed with facilities they do not have (planer
knives for patterns, dry kiln, etc.), or because they do not have
customer outlets which can sell the end products.
In the study of competitors a simple correlation of sales
participation according to various market or bidder character“
See Miller and Starr, op. cit., p. 237 or Oxenfeldt, et al., op. cit., p. 61.
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istics would probably yield workable first approximations that
can be refined with experience or adjusted to unique situations.
One might compare bidding experiences by the size of the sale,
the species offered, the location of the sale (geographically),
the timing of a sale in a series of sales (for example when
approaching the end of a large volume selling season, or during
low versus high volume marketing year, and so on), volumes of
stumpage under contract, and perhaps one might even relate
sales to current market prices or volumes of green and dry
lumber in the m ill’
s inventory.
A study of this formal nature would not produce stumpage
values (either on a lump sum or a per thousand board foot
basis) that could be used directly as bids. All the other factors
mentioned which have not been quantified (and which may
not be random) must then be evaluated until a bid value is
established. However, the base value to which the separate
and unique elements are added or subtracted is more de
fensible than an arbitrarily (often capriciously) selected figure.
An arbitrary figure, even if it is precisely accurate, cannot be of
any future value because the determination of it is non-logical
and, hence, cannot be the basis for any succeeding estimate.
As the bidding model indicates, one would expect the zone of
uncertainty to be reduced materially; hopefully too, the margin
of bid values above the second highest bidder would be nar
rowed. The potential gain from improved skill in buying is
substantial, as will be documented in a later publication. A
contribution to profit generated from this source does not
involve capital investment, additional labor, or selling effort.
A firm that undertakes a reappraisal of its bidding strategy
along the lines suggested should be rewarded for its efforts in
some degree.14
"The writer is mindful of the many ramifications of interdependence
(with other firms) in influencing a firm ’
s strategy. However, even twoplayer game theory analysis would add little understanding to the
restricted problem under discussion; one might even question the
assumption of any response, let alone a rapid response, in many bidding
situations. To the bidder, a com petitor’
s reaction is post facto and
would be incorporated in later bidding experience tabulations. Further
more, this is only one of many considerations, some of which are of
greater significance.
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Why is it, Americans wonder, that millions of persons are
under the domination of communism? Why do the leaders
of some states proudly assert that they are communists? How
do they manage to retain power when, Americans suspect,
many of their subjects are hostile? These are some of the
questions frequently asked by individuals who want to under
stand the nature and appeal of communism as a political force.
In the world of politics the twentieth century has witnessed
two major attacks on the basic assumptions of liberal de
mocracies, The first of these attacks, that of communism,
resulted from the successful communist revolution in Russia
during World War I. Soon the challenge of fascism appeared
as an equally deadly threat to democratic governments. But
World War II destroyed the military strength of the fascist
powers, and without their armed forces the fascists lost their
primary means of spreading their doctrine and influence. The
war was hardly over, however, before the threat presented by
communism re-emerged. No longer could communism be
regarded as a peculiarly Russian phenomenon; Russia now
threatened to engulf the whole of the European continent as
she had Eastern Europe.
Even though the Russian armies were the principal means
of spreading communism beyond the Russian borders, the
attraction of communist ideology must not be underrated. As
contrasted with the racially-limited appeals of fascist political
theory, communism addresses itself to the world as the true
supporter of values highly regarded in the West. The com-
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munists claim that the ideals of the French Revolution—
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity—have been frustrated by
present-day “democratic” societies; only when economic
equality has been achieved can the democratic ideals be at
tained, they argue. Thus communism does not openly attack
the goals to which other democracies subscribe; rather, it mixes
traditional democratic ideas and practices with elements (such
as terror) which are foreign to the practices of liberal de
mocracies. Fascism, with its open denunciation of the tradi
tional democratic value system and practices, was an enemy
much easier to identify.
With its mixture of democratic ideals and revolutionary
means to achieve them, communism has been able to present
itself as a proponent of social and economic justice. The com
munist leaders attempt to persuade the landless, ignorant and
destitute masses in the underdeveloped countries that com
munism will provide a new life of abundance, prosperity and
happiness. For many who know only despair, communism is
welcomed as the new creed to be followed with a religious
fanaticism. To believe that communism is spread primarily
through conspiracy is misleading; rather, it constitutes a threat
because it is embraced when it seems that peaceful change is
either too slow or else totally hopeless. Its idealistic appeals
are too often accepted at face value. The communist threat,
then, is a combination of military, economic and social factors.
I
The previous articles in this series have outlined some of
the major ideas of Marx and Engels. It will be recalled that
these two social critics believed that they had found in the
class struggle the key to understanding history. The constant
struggle over the goods available to societies in the past had
resulted in the development of new means of production
around which the classes revolved. The process had inevitably
resulted in the development of a capitalistic system, they
argued, and the next stage predetermined by the scientific
laws was that of the classless society of communism. The
capitalist system, marked by the deadly struggle between the
two classes — workers and capitalists — must yield to a final
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society in which no class can exploit another, as done in all
other societies. While the communists have been inconsistent
in answering the question of whether a violent revolution is
necessary for the overthrow of the capitalist system, they
have always agreed that the state must be abolished. For them,
the state, the legal system, the church, and the code of morality
have always been used by the dominant economic and political
class to maintain its control while exploiting the other classes—
all these institutions must be overthrown. True democracy
can exist only where economic exploitation has ceased, Marx
and Engels argued, and that will happen only in the final
communist society.
Marx and Engels did not live to see a successful communist
revolution staged. A new group of leaders under Lenin led
the communist forces which first successfully imposed com
munist rule over a large society, a society so backward that
Marx and Engels considered it hardly ripe for a communist
revolution. Lenin’
s chief contribution to communist theory
concerned the critical problem of who was to direct the
revolution and how it was to be done. As he saw the problem,
neither the mass of workers (who were far too easily satisfied
with piecemeal reforms) nor the peasants (whose petty-capi
talist attitudes made them suspect) could successfully stage a
revolution. What was needed was a “
small compact core,
consisting of reliable, experienced and hardened workers,”
joined by “
all the rules of strict secrecy”into organizations of
revolutionaries. This small core — the Communist Party —
would direct the revolution and bring society to the final stage
of communism.
Lenin’
s ideas on the organization of the Communist Party
and on its relationship to the state have had a continuing
impact both inside and outside Russia. The Communist Party,
according to Lenin, should be organized under the concept
of “
democratic centralism”which, while superficially demo
cratic in character, leads inevitably to a personal dictatorship.
The state apparatus, Lenin maintained, having been wrenched
from the control of the capitalists would now be used to
destroy the capitalists, and to control society in the transitional
stage to full communism. Gradually the state would wither
away, but that cannot occur until everyone in society has
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been re-educated along proper communist lines to live in a
classless society. Nor can it happen until the capitalist states
no longer surround the communist ones, ready to devour
them if possible.

II
The political structure of a communist society provides a
fascinating study of an attempt by an elite group to impose
total control over a large and complex mechanism. Since the
Soviet Union is the best known communist state, a brief
analysis of its structure of power is instructive as an example
of the way in which political decisions are made and enforced
in communist states.
The obvious and overriding consideration in this analysis
is the dominant position of the Communist Party itself. The
Communist Party as the only legal party seeks to perpetuate
its control of society through a variety of means. This selfperpetuating elite claims that it alone of all groups possesses
the correct understanding of the scientific laws governing
history. Consequently, it claims the right to direct and lead
society along the path to communism, employing the necessary
means of coercion and persuasion as it sees fit.
How are members recruited and selected for this elite organ
ization? Membership in the Party is, of course, far different
from party membership in the United States. In the United
States, affiliation with the Democratic or Republican Party
is more a state of mind, a general support of a certain party
and some of its leaders, or a consistent willingness to vote for
one party. In communist states, party membership is of a
formal card-carrying type. Since the Party is still the small,
select elite, special duties and privileges attach to party mem
bership, and not all those who seek (or avoid) membership are
permitted to do so. After Stalin’
s death in 1953, the Russian
Communist Party grew quite rapidly. Nevertheless, the num
ber stands at only about nine million members out of a popula
tion of about 215 million, or about one person out of twentyfour. Also, in every communist state the Party draws a dis
proportionate share of its strength from the urban worker
and professional groups rather than from the peasants. It is
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significant too that in Russia the Party draws a disproportion
ate amount of strength from the Great Russians, as a nation
ality group, as compared with the numerous minority nationali
ties within Russia. It is the Great Russians, living primarily in
the area centering on Moscow, who have provided the leader
ship of the Russian state and who have always tended to hold
the minority nationalities in subjection. As a generalization,
the more rural the area and the more geographically removed
from Moscow, the weaker the Communist Party is in organ
ization and membership.
Although full Party membership is open to relatively few,
the Party nevertheless attempts to maintain a broad base
from which to select. Indeed, as with all modern totalitarian
systems, a tremendous effort is made in organizing and in
doctrinating the youth who will be the Party members of
tomorrow. The process begins at the early age of five when
virtually all youngsters become members of an organization
known as the “
Little Octobrists.” At the age of ten the child
is promoted to an organization known as the “Young Pioneers,”
which again includes almost all children. In both of these
organizations, the children are taught about their leaders
and the glories of their society. Symbols, emblems and
pageantry designed to appeal to the young are essential ele
ments in these organizations; political instruction at these
lower levels plays a relatively small role.
At the age of fourteen, the child is eligible for membership
in the organization known as the “
Komsomols.” It is at this
level that the process of selection begins, for not all Young
Pioneers are permitted entry. The Komsomol organization,
which numbers about twenty million members, forms the
main reservoir for Party members and consequently the
members are put through a vigorous testing period of both a
theoretical and practical nature. Members are subjected to
intense political indoctrination under the guidance of the Com
munist Party; in turn, they are expected to serve as agitators
for communism and are given the special responsibility for the
political training of the Young Pioneers. Komsomols are also
expected to provide leadership in athletics and work programs.
Their elementary training in the military arts is utilized for
military demonstrations and serves to provide the armed forces
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with a group of trained civilians from which to draw. In all
three youth organizations, the programs are so planned to
dominate the time of the members in their after-school and
after-work hours. By the age of twenty-eight, at which age
the Komsomols who have not become Party members or who
do not hold official Komsomol positions are dropped from the
organization, the Party hopes to have molded a group of dedi
cated young men and women, well organized and well in
doctrinated.
In none of the communist countries has this goal of the Party
been fully achieved, however, as is evident from the frequent
criticisms by the Party leaders. Many units of the youth
groups are not well organized. And, as might be expected,
some young people do not find the communist theory par
ticularly exciting and they become bored with the repetition
of words and slogans. Some members are interested primarily
in the social benefits, the dances and parties, which are avail
able only to members. Many join because of the better oppor
tunities for a university education. Still others join because
they are aware that membership in these organizations leads
to Party membership, and the best jobs in Soviet society are
held by Party members.
Although many join the organizations because they believe
in communism, it seems to be reasonably clear that there has
been a decline in the revolutionary enthusiasm which charac
terized the early years of rapid industrialization after the Revo
lution. At the same time, the minds and bodies of the youth
in the communist countries cannot escape being molded by the
many years of careful manipulation and training by the Party.
Constant indoctrination and nationalistic appeals to support
the fatherland do have an impact.
Despite the commitment of the Party leaders to keep the
Party small and to recruit only the most “advanced”youths
and other politically reliable older persons, the membership
policy of the Party faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it needs
to recruit the most highly trained and educated members of
society if it is to remain the dominant force in the decision
making process. It needs to include representatives of the
highest ranks of industry and technology if it is to retain and
consolidate its position as the governing elite. However, as an
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elite group in the society, it runs the risk of alienating the
masses of workers and peasants who are outside the Party.
But by including elites of all major groups in its membership,
the Party possesses the power to control all of the important
positions in those organizations (such as the army and the
secret police) which might be capable of challenging its
authority.
The Russian Communist Party can serve as the representa
tive sample of the organizational structure of all communist
parties. At the top of the Party hierarchy sits the Presidium.
Today this small group of about twelve members and six
alternates of the top Party leadership is headed by Khrush
chev. According to the Party Rules, the Presidium is elected
by the Central Committee, a large group of over three hundred
members and alternates. In fact, however, once the dominant
figure of the Party, such as Stalin or Khrushchev, has suc
ceeded in consolidating his power, the members of the Pre
sidium are picked by him and their selection is merely ratified
by the Central Committee. The Central Committee, in turn,
is “
elected”by the Party Congress which, according to the
rules, is the governing body of the Party. But again, the
election by the Congress is merely the ratification of persons
chosen by the Party leaders. While the Party Congress met
irregularly during Stalin’
s rule, it has convened regularly
under Khrushchev, but no significant debate takes place and
all decisions of the Party leaders are still approved unani
mously. The purpose of the Congress, then, has never been to
debate policy; rather, it serves as a sounding-board for the
policy statements made by the Party leaders.
To help the Presidium and the Central Committee in their
work of preparing decrees, supervising the lower levels of
the Party organization, and checking on the fulfillment of
Party orders, a Secretariat of about twelve persons is “
elected”
by the Central Committee. Under Stalin the Secretariat be
came one of the main organs through which Party control was
exercised. Khrushchev, like Stalin before him, has assumed
the important position of First Secretary of the Secretariat.
This position gives him effective control because it enables
him to select the Party secretaries at all of the lower levels
of the Party organization. It is the secretary of the local Party
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organization who directs the activities of the Party members.
Thus, control over the secretaries enables Khrushchev to main
tain effective discipline over the whole party apparatus.1
Below the level of the Party Congress, the Party is organized
to parallel the governmental structure of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union is divided into the union republics, such as
Georgia, and then into regions, areas, cities and towns. The
Party follows this general structure and continues it down to
the primary units, of which there are about 300,000. Primary
units are organized with a minimum of three Party members
and may be found in factories, towns, army units, schools,
shops, and any other place where Party members can meet.
These primary units have important functions. They admit
new members, indoctrinate them in communist theory, distri
bute Party literature, direct the Komsomols, and in general
attempt to provide leadership for the masses at the local level.
Within these primary units, as well as in the higher ones, the
secretary is the central figure.
Despite the attempt to create a monolithic party of dedi
cated members, there are indications that this ideal has not
always been achieved. The Party press is frequently critical
of members who neglect their duties or merely go through the
motions. Others are criticized for being more interested in
their non-Party careers, using their Party affiliations for
furthering their other interests. Tensions and rivalries exist
in communist societies as well as in every other type, and the
formal structure cannot cope with all of them. Since these
conflicts cannot be readily expressed in the formal structure
of a totalitarian society, they take devious forms, such as
bribery, false reports, and special concessions for friends and
family members.
The struggle over the top leadership position perhaps most
dramatically illustrates the inability of a totalitarian society to
handle basic conflicts in a prescribed manner. Lenin had revised
M arx’
s theory that the proletariat as a group would form the
'There is no comparable power exercised by any American party official
over one of our parties, which are characterized by their loose organi
zation at the national level. Even within our individual state party
organizations, few party officials can exercise extensive control over
the local party organization.
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governing dictatorship after the revolution; according to Lenin,
only the Communist Party could perform this role. But, as
s theory would result in a personal
Trotsky predicted, Lenin’
dictatorship, though Lenin himself never admitted that such
a development was desirable. If Lenin’
s principle of “
collec
tive leadership”had been adhered to, the death of one leader
would have made little difference since the rest of the group
making up the collective leadership would still continue. How
ever, the death of Lenin was followed by a period of intense
Party infighting among the major leaders. Gradually, Stalin
emerged as the single dictator. He consolidated his position
by 1934 and ruthlessly eliminated his opponents in the terrible
purges of the 1930s.
In stable democracies such as the United States and Great
Britain, the problem of succession causes little trouble, since
provision is made for the orderly transfer of power. But the
very nature of totalitarian dictatorships precludes this kind of
solution. Law, at least for the ruling group, does not impose
any restraint, nor does a dictatorship depend upon the support
of the society as a whole to make legitimate whatever the
dictator does. The inner compulsion in a totalitarian system
to concentrate authority in the hands of one individual results
from the inability of the ruling group to agree upon binding
rules. Consequently, the unlimited control of the major poli
tical forces, the army or the bureaucracy, for example, is up
for grabs. In a totalitarian society in the period before a single
dictator emerges, whoever can secure control over an instru
ment of force can make it “legally” his. Thus “
collective
leadership”cannot be expected to endure for any great length
of time; sooner or later, one person in the group will emerge
with more power concentrated in his hands than in the hands
of his competitors. Then he will be in a position to eliminate
his competitors unless they accept his direction. The bitter
struggle over succession following the death of Lenin, and
again after Stalin, supports the idea that collective leadership
gives way to a single dictator.
It is also difficult for a dictator to select his successor with
any great assurance that he will be successful in manipulating
the controls of the dictatorship. For one thing, a successful
dictator is far more dependent upon his personal ability to
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maneuver and control the instruments of power than upon the
“legal”powers he possesses. A single weakness in the suc
cessor’
s abilities, such a tendency toward indecision or an
unwillingness to hurt his friends, may cause his downfall.
Again, a dictator must create the illusion of infallibility, and
this image is difficult to transfer to a subordinate. The dictator
cannot share his position with a handpicked successor who may
be defeated by his opponents before he can demonstrate his
“
infallibility.” Thus, when a dictator dies or is eliminated, a
period of collective leadership will follow until one of the
leaders gradually gains possession of the major instruments of
control. Once a new dictator has emerged, he cannot share his
power or his infallibility for, if he does, he may well find
himself at the wrong end of the execution rifle held by his
“designated”successor who has preempted his position.
The succession struggles through which Stalin and then
Khrushchev rose to power provide an illuminating study of
how a totalitarian system operates. Each of them used his posi
tion as the First Secretary of the Party to pack the lower ranks
with supporters and through them to gain control of the Party
Congresses and the Central Committee. Both Stalin and
Khrushchev used the Party’
s control over the armed forces, the
police, the government, and the communications media to de
prive their opponents of support from outside the Party hier
archy. Again, they both possessed personal talents of intrigue
and manipulation which were superior to their opponents’
,
and they were both able to build up their power within the
Party in an inconspicuous manner until they were too strong
to be easily dislodged.
Conditions, of course, were not completely identical. The
control of the huge bureaucracy and the armed forces was a
more important factor in the second struggle. Also, Khrush
chev’
s struggle was far less marked by controversy over theory
and ideology. Nevertheless, the two struggles illustrate some
important points concerning the problem of succession in a
totalitarian society. The first point has already been made—
that the logic of totalitarianism seems to result in a single
dictatorship. The second point is that the Party machine has
shown a significant vitality even in the crisis periods, and the
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control of it, as Khrushchev again demonstrated, is of vital
importance to the control of the society.
Still, the two struggles suggest that the bases of political
power may be undergoing substantial change. For example,
the contestants in the succession struggle after Stalin’
s death
were far more concerned than he had ever been with their
“
public image.” All of them sought public favor by promising
a relaxation of controls, more consumer goods, and other objec
tives desired by the common man. It is this slowly growing
dependence on popular support that many observers see as
one of the most important changes occurring in Russian
totalitarianism.2
The measurement of popular support of a totalitarian regime
is always most difficult. Public opinion polls as well as poli
tical elections are, on the whole, meaningless as expressions
of popular support. Since the press and other communications
media are controlled by the Party and the government, views
which run too sharply counter to official policy cannot easily
be circulated. Consequently, the leaders have had to devise
other organs to record and control popular opinions. The crea
tion, control and measurement of popular opinion is, of course,
part of a complex two-way system of communications. A vast
information-gathering and information-dispersing system is
utilized, including the governmental and administrative struc
tures, the secret police, the Party apparatus, letters to the offi
cial organs, meetings, and tours conducted for Party leaders.
Accurate information on the state of public opinion and morale
is often difficult to obtain, however, because many people
distort their reports to make them conform to what they
believe the leaders want to hear.
All totalitarian regimes constantly use propaganda to create
a favorable public opinion. The communists saturate their
publics with propaganda: the lectures in the schools and at
'What has been said about the succession struggle in Russia seems likely
to hold true for those communist states not completely dominated by
the Soviet Union, such as China, Yugoslavia, and, perhaps, Poland and
Rumania. However, in those countries such as East Germany, where
Soviet control is virtually complete, the succession struggle for nominal
leadership would have injected into it the additional and probably
decisive factor of Soviet influence.
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places of work, the “
socialist realism”portrayed in music, art
and literature, the voices over the radio and television, and
the printed word are all used in the praise of communism and
the leaders. This propaganda also urges individuals in society
to do their duty and assume their responsibilities for the pro
motion of the cause.
Ultimately, however, the leaders are forced to use coercion
when persuasion fails. For the purposes of coercion, the com
munist leaders surround themselves with a set of institutions
whose total impact is overwhelming. The major institutions
of control include the Party, whose dominant position in society
has already been described, the governmental apparatus, the
secret police, and the armed forces.
The governmental apparatus in communist states is estab
lished under what are proudly termed the most democratic
constitutions in the world. In form, their claim has some merit,
but the communists have never shared the Western view that
constitutions exist to define the limits on governmental auth
ority. In Western countries the constitution also creates a
neutral governmental structure, accepted and utilized by
opposing parties whenever they win control in a free election.
In communist states, however, the state organs are subjected
to the dictates of the Communist Party and any opposition is
outlawed. M arx’
s concept of the state apparatus as a tool of
the dominant political class in society holds true in the com
munist states far more than in any capitalist state.
The constitutions of communist countries serve several im
portant functions. First, they specify the formal structure and
powers of the government. No large society can exist without
some formal organization, and the communist states as well
as others need the stabilizing influence of formal structures.
Second, the constitutions play an important propaganda role.
They help to conceal the position of the Party by making it
appear that popularly elected office-holders make the im
portant decisions. Domestically, the constitutions are used as
the symbol around which support is rallied in demonstration
that all opposition to the regime has ceased and is outmoded.
Elections become a means of educating, organizing and rallying
the masses; they are intended to demonstrate to all the world
the complete solidarity of the masses with the regime.
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Typically, the constitutions establish the usual organs of
government: a legislative body, an executive, and a system of
courts. In Russia, the importance of nationality groups is recog
nized by the creation of “
states”called union-republics, each of
which has its own legislative and executive bodies. As with
our own constitution, the popularly elected legislature enjoys
precedence. In Russia the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is the
national “
congress,”made up of two chambers. According to
the constitution, it possesses all legislative powers, passing laws
by simple majority vote. The Supreme Soviet elects the
Presidium (not to be confused with the Presidium of the
Party), which is somewhat like a collective presidency, made
up of a chairman and thirty-two other members. The Presi
dium performs the ceremonial functions of the state and has a
few other jobs of a judicial and administrative nature.
The real power in the governmental structure, however, is
found in the Council of Ministers, which corresponds roughly
to our cabinet. Theoretically responsible to the Supreme Soviet
and to the Presidium, it is in fact picked by, and largely consists
of, the top Party leadership. Khrushchev, for example, is the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers in addition to his other
top Party positions.
While nominally free, elections to all of these positions—
representatives to the Supreme Soviet, to the Presidium and
to the Council of Ministers—are in reality controlled by the
Communist Party. Altogether, about 1,900,000 persons are
elected to positions in local, regional and national governments;
while not all who are elected are Party members, only trusted
citizens can secure the nominations and elections on the oneparty ballot. Elections, consequently, do not have the same
meaning as they do in Western democracies where voters
choose between competing programs and candidates. The func
tion of communist elections, as noted above, is to rally the
people behind their leaders in a mass demonstration of support
(however forced). The Party Leadership through its control of
the elections to the offices assures itself of continuous control.
Policy makers in every government are confronted with the
major problem of ensuring that policies are administered in the
manner intended. In a totalitarian state, where so many activi
ties are centrally planned, the job of establishing an efficient,
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effective bureaucracy is enormous. Thus the communist organ
izational structure is far more complicated than anything
known in the West. When successfully organized and oper
ating, the bureaucracy represents a most effective instrument
of control. However, the threat of breakdowns presents a con
tinuously critical problem. To prevent politically inspired
breakdowns, the bureaucrats are constantly checked upon, but
this fact itself tends to make efficiency even more difficult. At
times the desperate bureaucrats resort to illegal means to get
their job done, but the penalty for serious illegal actions is
heavy.
Terror is another essential and characteristic instrument of
control in any totalitarian system. The secret police and the
informer, the forced labor camps and the crowded prisons are
all part of the familiar apparatus of a totalitarian regime. Al
though no dictator can rely solely upon terror for control,
ultimately it must be available to him in order to safeguard
his monopoly on power. Dictators vary in their reliance on
terror; Khrushchev, for example, has attempted to rely more
on loyalty, devotion and incentives than did Stalin, but the
actions of the citizens in a totalitarian state are always condi
tioned by the knowledge that the instruments of terror can
be brought into play.
It is (tragically) easy to justify the use of terror in such a
system. Since the dictator is always right, those who oppose
him are not only wrong but also dangerous and so must be
destroyed. There is no room in a totalitarian state for the
concept of a “
loyal opposition.” Since the “
enemy”may be
lurking anywhere, constant surveillance and vigilance is re
quired. Secret arrests, secret trials, and summary executions
are utilized to destroy the enemy and to terrorize possible ene
mies into inaction. Informers and agents are placed in factories,
in the armed forces, on the collective farms and every other
place where people gather.
Under Stalin the secret police penetrated the whole web of
society as the instruments of terror were sharpened to a fine,
deadly system. Denunciations were encouraged. People were
subjected to interrogation, often to the point of intimidation.
After a period of questioning, the dreaded wait began, a wait
often culminating in a midnight arrest. After the arrest, an
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attempt was made to secure a voluntary confession of “guilt.”
Torture was a convenient prod, and a failure to confess could
lead to retaliation against the prisoner’
s family. The longer
the accused refused to confess, the more severe the penalty.
When a “
voluntary”confession was obtained, the “trial” or
sentencing could be undertaken. Throughout the proceedings,
the prisoner was assumed to be guilty. There was no use for
the “
bourgeois” concept of believing a man to be innocent
until proven guilty.
Under Stalin, too, the use of forced labor became a notorious
symbol of his totalitarian rule. In the forced labor camps, the
political prisoners suffered not only from the police but from
ordinary criminals who were their camp masters. Although
reliable figures are impossible to obtain, reputable scholars
estimate that between seven and fourteen million prisoners
worked in these camps under Stalin. Since Stalin’
s death there
appears to have been a relaxation of political terror and the
use of forced labor. But while the cruder forms of terror and
the massive exploitation of slave labor undertaken by Stalin
have eased, it would be a mistake to believe that terror does
not remain a basic instrument of control in communist societies
today. As a high official in Khrushchev’
s government was
quoted as saying in 1957, “
Compulsion may be necessary. . . .
If it becomes necessary we will restore the old methods. But I
think it will not be necessary.
A reliance on terror has its own dangers, however. A secret
police system is not an easy instrument to control. Since it
feeds on evidence of “treason”it tends to manufacture such
evidence if it is not otherwise available. But the rulers need
reliable evidence if they are to govern with any sense of
reality. Stalin, according to Khrushchev, became trapped by
his own suspicions and fears which were nourished by the
secret police reports he had available. Then too, there is
always the fear of the ruling group that they will lose control
over the police and find themselves the victims of the monster
they have created. The system of terror also destroys initiative
and creativity and thus corrupts the efficient use of brain
power and man power.
’
Quoted in Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (2nd ed. rev.: Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 450.
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Still another instrument of control to which the com
munists have given considerable attention is that of the armed
forces. Without a loyal and efficient military force, a modern
totalitarian system could not long endure. As with the secret
police system, there are two aspects to the problem, loyalty and
efficiency. A disloyal military force, no matter how efficient,
is a positive danger to the rulers, but a military force of loyal
supporters who are grossly inefficient in their abilities to
use their weapons is of little positive value.
In order to assure the loyalty of the armed forces, a complex
system of controls penetrates every aspect of every level of
the armed forces. In the Soviet army two hierarchies operate
along with the military command. One of these “
non-military”
hierarchies is made up of political workers in the Party organ
izations. Communist Party and Komsomol units are found at
all levels of the army and through them an attempt is made
to indoctrinate and check upon the political loyalty of all
troops. The other hierarchy consists of agents of the secret
police whose job it is to check, along with the Party, upon the
loyalty of the troops and to root out and punish disloyalty.
Strenuous efforts are made to enroll the military officers
in the Party organizations where they will be subject to direct
Party control. The noncommissioned officers and troops are
encouraged to join the Komsomol and Party units. Ambitious
officers and troops who desire rapid promotion realize that
Party membership is one of the prerequisites to high military
positions. Even those military personnel who remain outside
the formal organizations are influenced daily by the steady
diet of communist propaganda. Positive loyalty is appealed to
through patriotism and pride in Soviet military achievements,
along with the incentives of promotion, good food and housing,
and recreation. But if these incentives prove to be inadequate,
the secret police are there inside the armed forces to punish
severely any act of disloyalty, whether intentional or not.
All of these controls can and have had an adverse effect
upon military efficiency. By creating conflicting authorities,
the individual officer is subjected to stresses, frictions and
rivalries which are not easily resolved. The professional
military officer tends to place his military duties above his
obligations as a Party member. Yet he often finds his authority
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as an officer subverted by Party or secret police personnel who
are, nominally, under his command. If he refuses to pay atten
tion to the “
advice”of such subordinates he may easily find
himself in trouble. Sometimes such advice goes far beyond
political advice and extends to purely military matters such as
tactics; when it does, the officer finds himself in an almost
intolerable position.
The surveillance of the secret police teaches an officer, of
necessity, to suppress his thoughts and hold his tongue if he
wishes to advance. To suggest or develop a new tactic or plan
may be considered disloyal when it constitutes an attack on the
established procedures. Consequently, initiative is weakened
or destroyed. The problem of the dictator, then, is to find a
way to permit and encourage “loyal”ideas for improvement,
but still retain full political control.
With its impressive system of overlapping controls, a totali
tarian regime can give an impression of overpowering strength.
Its true condition, however, can be quite different. Changes
are forced by industrialization with its tremendous impact on
all aspects of society. Long-term droughts, famines, floods and
other disasters create pressures. So do changes in the standard
of living. Shifting alliances among friendly and enemy states
create new problems. Over all these changes the dictator tries
to ride herd, maintaining his position both at home and in the
world.
One of the favorite games played by observers, especially of
the Soviet scene, is that of speculating on the impact of in
dustrialization on a totalitarian regime. Some feel that totali
tarianism must undergo considerable change, accompanied by
a general relaxation of controls. Their argument proceeds,
briefly, as follows: Industrialization creates a gigantic need
for technicians, engineers and administrators. This industrial
elite must be competent, secure and free to seek efficient solu
tions to their problems, regardless of Party dogma. They can
not thrive under totalitarian controls which deprive them of
this freedom. The dictator must permit them to develop an
efficient industrial machine if he is to retain his position in a
rapidly developing, industrialized world. To the extent that the
Party draws into its ranks the industrial elite in an effort to
control them, the Party leadership dilutes its dominant position.
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For, as was noted above, the industrial elite are less concerned
with Party dogma than with their industrial problems. Then
too, as the benefits of industrialization filter down to the masses
in the form of a higher standard of living, the ordinary citizen
will begin to demand the right to make political choices just
as he is making economic choices in consumer goods. The total
effect will be to weaken the totalitarian system by making it
more responsive to the masses who, it is supposed, do not want
rigid, all-inclusive controls.
On the other hand, many observers believe that so far as
internal political forces are concerned, the Party has built an
almost indestructible system of controls. So long as the Party
penetrates every level and aspect of life, so long as it controls
promotions to the decision-making positions in all branches of
society and maintains its system of checks and crosschecks,
there is little prospect for substantial change. Only if the Party
leaders themselves destroy their own Party will major changes
occur, and few would wish to destroy the very institution
which has given them their power. These critics also point to
the example of Nazi Germany, an industrialized society run by
a dictator, as evidence that industrialization and totalitarian
controls are not necessarily incompatible. Industrialization,
they add, undercuts many of the stabilizing institutions of
society such as the family and the church, and the search for
certainty and security may lead some persons to embrace
totalitarian controls. For them, democracy, which demands a
respect for diversity and a distrust of absolutes, is not ap
pealing.

Ill
As a political force in world politics, communism presents
many faces. Certain basic characteristics of communism which
are hostile to liberal democracies remain constant, but the
various local brands of communism complicate enormously the
task of policy makers in democratic states. This survey can
only suggest some of the broad features of this international
political force.
On one important point all communists seem to agree:
capitalism is doomed and communism is inevitable. They argue
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that all capitalist states have been reduced to mere satellites
of the master, the United States, and that this capitalist bloc
of states is fighting a rear-guard action to preserve its dominant
position in the underdeveloped areas of the world. In an at
tempt to divert people’
s attention from capitalist misrule and
exploitation, the capitalists blame all the evils in the world on
communism, in addition to accusing it of preparing for war.
It is inevitable, the communists agree, that major uprisings
will occur in which the chains clamped on by the capitalists
and imperialists will be cut and thrown off. Then it will be
possible for the whole world to move into the stage of com
munism.
But though the communists are certain of eventual victory,
they are sharply divided on how to guarantee the “inevitable”
success of communism. For no matter how much the com
munists attempt to spread and support the popular impression
that the communist bloc represents a unified, monolithic move
ment, the impression is false. The bitter controversy now raging
between China and Russia is only the most spectacular example
of the several major quarrels dividing the communist states.
There are several aspects to the Chinese-Soviet dispute. Not
only is there a serious personal rivalry between Khrushchev
and Mao Tse-tung, but the rapidly growing Chinese population
combined with a possible improvement in its economic and
military position poses a threat to the borders of Russia. Sooner
or later, some observers feel, the Chinese will seek room for
expansion into Russian territory.
More important, perhaps, are the serious ideological and
political splits between the two giants, such as that concerning
the manner in which relations with the West should be handled.
The Russians have accepted the reality of nuclear destruction
and argue that the capabilities of Western military strength
require a period of coexistence. The Chinese, on the other
hand, support a position of outright belligerence, risking war if
necessary to destroy capitalism. According to the Chinese,
Lenin’
s theory of the inevitability of war cannot be scrapped,
while Khrushchev in a speech in 1960 argued that there was
no longer any alternative to peace. The class struggle must be
carried through to its completion, the Chinese declare, and they
maintain that Marx was correct when he said that no signifi-
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cant changes ever occurred in human society without the appli
cation of force and violence—a view now repudiated by the
Russian leaders. The signing of the test-ban treaty by Russia
and its rejection by the Chinese indicates this split.
Other issues divide the communist bloc. One issue is whether
there can be local brands of communism or whether all must
conform to the established model. Tito in 1947 began the move
ment toward greater independence in the policies to be pursued
by the states within the communist bloc, a movement subse
quently followed by Poland, Rumania, and for a time, by
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Another issue currently being
argued is the extent to which the Soviet satellite states should
be linked economically with Russia. Rumania’
s attempt to
create its own industrial machine is indicative of the reluctance
of the satellites to submit to Russian controls and directives.
Just as there is disagreement in this country and among our
allies on the question of aid to underdeveloped areas, so is there
in the communist bloc. There are communists who wish to
conserve the resources of the communist states for the primary
struggle with the United States rather than to commit these
resources to adventures which they cannot control. Other com
munists believe that everything possible should be done to
move in and control the colonial rebellions and the movements
for independence. The control of these “
revolutions of rising
expectations”is difficult, however, because the causes of the
unrest in the underdeveloped areas are so complex. Contrary to
popular impressions, the record of communist achievements
in the revolutionary movements has not been spectacular.
The communists have made few significant contributions to
the colonial revolutions in Southern Asia, Equatorial Africa,
or Central or South America. It is not that they have not tried.
They have been giving increasing military and economic aid
along with political support to the revolutionary regimes. But
they have rarely caused or significantly speeded up any revo
lutions. The basic causes for the unrest in underdeveloped
regions go far deeper than communist subversion.4
‘
Even if communist ideology and power were to disappear today, the
basic causes giving rise to the unrest in the underdeveloped areas would
remain tomorrow. This is so because the West brought to these areas
ideas and practices, such as Christianity, free enterprise, education,
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Politically, the growing diversity in world communism and
the growing strength of the communist states present a com
plex set of problems. As the communists grow in strength
and confidence perhaps they will relax their aggressive efforts,
convinced that since ultimate victory is theirs, risky actions are
unnecessary. Or else the opposite may happen; their growing
strength may make them more cocky and demanding than ever
before. Or perhaps the controversies within the communist
bloc over the correct approach will become so serious that
no united front can again be presented. In such a development
Western policy makers could formulate policies to exploit the
weaknesses of the communist bloc.
With the growing diversity in world communism, the range
of alternative policies open to the West increases. But as the
former well-defined military threat of communism diminishes
in relative importance because of the nuclear stalemate, the
Western allies find it increasingly difficult to maintain a
united policy. The communist military threat can be met by
Western military power. But how should the West meet the
threat of communist ideology and its non-military policies?
On these issues the Western allies do not always agree. As
Charles de Gaulle has dramatically demonstrated in his recog
nition of Communist China, various policies are now possible.
Trade with communist states presents another dilemma, as does
the problem of meeting the communist threat in the under
developed countries. It is not surprising that the allies cannot
concur on all policies in view of the complexity of the issues
involved.
Within the United States, communist theories and practices
have attracted few adherents, except possibly during the de
pression years of the 1930s. Today, for all intents and purposes,
the American Communist Party is dead. The communists have
had little success in recruiting working class people and
nationalism and democracy, which disrupted native cultures and values
but often failed to provide the means to achieve the goals of happiness
and prosperity. The material misery (about two-thirds of the w orld’
s
population exists on an average per capita income of less than one
hundred fifty dollars a year) is seen by the political leaders in these
areas as requiring drastic action. Westerners are, consequently, often
a primary target in these uprisings because they are held to blame for
failure to supply the means to the desired end.
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Negroes because the success of our system in solving social
and economic problems gives the lie to communist claims that
we cannot solve these problems peacefully. Although the Com
munists can be expected to attempt to infiltrate reputable
social and economic organizations, such as churches, labor
unions, and Negro organizations, there is no evidence that
their propaganda and methods have any important appeal.
The major danger from internal communists stems from the
possibility of spying and sabotage, not from any mass appeal
or significant subversive efforts.
Most political scientists see in communism a system of ideas
and actions which has established itself as an alternative to
our own way of life. Communism has shown an undeniable
capacity to attract adherents, gain political control, and survive
as a system beyond the life of its creators. While it is difficult
for us to acknowledge the fact that communism presents to
many people an attractive alternative to democratic capitalism,
the challenge must be faced and, in the process, we must main
tain our own integrity and sanity. The great challenge of our
time is to find ways of resisting militant communism without
abandoning our own freedoms in the process.
The nature of communist societies must be understood in
order to comprehend the deep chasm separating them from
free societies. Education and the free exchange of information
and ideas are essential to the maintenance of the delicate fabric
of freedom and liberty; if too many tears and holes appear in
this fabric, the chief characteristics of the free society soon
disintegrate and disappear. Successful policies to meet the
communist challenge require the rational analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of the communist movement; but
free societies, if they are to remain free, cannot formulate
these policies using totalitarian devices of their own.
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